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Because both the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.〔The landmark study of military generations and factions is William Whitson's ''The Chinese High Command,'' Praeger, 1973〕 In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China by reference to these "generations". ==Terminology== While in English the chronological leadership groups are commonly referred to as "generations of Chinese leadership", there is no exact equivalent expression in Chinese. The usual term in official discourse for such a group is a "leadership collective", which are counted in generations. Thus, for example, the "first generation" of leaders identified below are labelled as "the first generation leadership collective". In official discourse, they are also not viewed as leaders of the ''state'' (the People's Republic of China), but rather leaders of the ''party'' (the Communist Party of China).〔See, e.g. 〕 In the Communist Party's official discourse, the "generational" division and identification of the "core leader" for each of the first, second and third generations was set down during the leadership of Jiang Zemin and first publicised in 1999. This division and identification was not uncontroversial at the time, since the party had hitherto regarded his immediate predecessors as the party's general secretary, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, as its leaders, and regarded Deng Xiaoping as the "power behind the throne" rather than a formal leader. The revision of party history into "generations" helped to secure Jiang's position as "core" and anointed heir. Through the invention of the concept of the "core", it also helped to de-legitimise Jiang's deposed predecessors (such as Hu and Zhao), by relegating them from party leader to mere "membership" of a "leadership collective", which also conveniently helped to legitimise their deposition. Jiang's successors have maintained this generational division, but have retreated from identifying a "core leader" in the fourth generation, and the succeeding general secretary Hu Jintao has never been identified in official announcements as the "core" of the fourth generation, preferring to be simply called by his title "General Secretary". Xi Jinping has continued this practice. The "leadership collective" at any one time usually, but not always, correlates with the members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, with the leader of the party (the Chairman or, after 1983, the General Secretary) often, but not always, the leader of this leadership collective. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Generations of Chinese leadership」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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